TET ’68 and the Failure of the American Intelligence Community

Since 1968, historians, and former U.S. military and government officials, have debated whether the American intelligence community failed to predict the Tet Offensive.

General William C. Westmoreland, as well as the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, claimed then, and later, that the U.S. intelligence system did not fail in the weeks before Tet.  According to these two men, both of whom had strong personal and professional reasons for downplaying any intelligence failure, the United States had anticipated the offensive.

Yet, despite the claims of Westmoreland and Helms, the historical record indicates that the U.S. intelligence community did not anticipate the Tet Offensive.  Consequently, when the offensive began across South Vietnam on January 30-31, 1968, top U.S. officials, including President Johnson, expressed astonishment at the size and intensity of the Communist military effort.

At the conclusion of the Tet Offensive in February, 1968, the CIA carried out an internal review of its intelligence collection and analysis procedures during the weeks prior to the offensive. That review absolved the CIA of operational negligence. The President’s Foreign Advisory Intelligence Board, which included members of the CIA, came to the same conclusion in a June, 1968, report, which stated, “…there are no grounds to support the charge of a major intelligence failure.”[1] The board based its conclusion on two pieces of shaky evidence: 1) Westmoreland cancelled the Tet truce in I Corps on January 29th, and; 2) Westmoreland ordered U.S. units on full alert across South Vietnam on January 30th.

General Westmoreland cancelled the Tet truce in I Corps at 5:00 p.m. on January 29, 1968, only seven hours before the Vietcong began major attacks in that area. Westmoreland ordered this limited truce cancellation because he believed the U.S. Marine base at Khe Sanh faced an imminent, large-scale, North Vietnamese assault. The MACV commander did not cancel the truce in I Corps because he believed the Vietcong and North Vietnamese would conduct attacks on hamlets, towns, and cities within both I Corps and II Corps later that night, nor did he know that Vietcong and North Vietnamese main forces would move on the city of Hue.

Regardless of Westmoreland’s truce cancellation, when the Communists struck in the early morning hours of January 30, at Danang, Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, Tan Canh (near Dak To), Kontum, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, and Qui Nhon, they took the Americans and South Vietnamese based at those locations completely by surprise.  “New York Times” reporter Tom Buckley wrote, “American sources seemed dismayed by the success of the closely coordinated attacks. They apparently caught the Vietnamese army and militia forces, which have primary responsibility for guarding the cities, off guard while they were celebrating [Tet]….”[2]

The attacks of January 30, should have taken place a day later, but because of a Communist communications snafu, Vietcong and North Vietnamese units went ahead and struck across I Corps and II Corps. These premature raids, and not effective U.S. intelligence collection, alerted the Americans to the possibility of additional attacks in the days ahead in other areas of the country.

After the first attacks of January 30, Westmoreland, now convinced that the Communists would launch further strikes elsewhere, but still not sure where, ordered a countrywide alert at 3:45 a.m., January 30, about twenty hours before the beginning of a series of major assaults and twenty-three hours before the spectacular attacks in Saigon. The general’s alert was so vague, and came so late, that U.S. and South Vietnamese units were still unprepared for the full fury of the Communist offensive, especially at Hue, Saigon, and the Mekong Delta towns of My Tho and Can Tho. Another U.S. intelligence board, (consisting of members of the CIA, the National Security Agency, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), which was set up to review U.S. intelligence in the two weeks prior to Tet, wrote in April, 1968, “Although warning had thus been provided, the intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy attack were not fully anticipated…Few US or GVN [Government of South Vietnam] officials believed the enemy would attack during Tet….”[3] The committee continued, “In IV CTZ, [the Mekong Delta] the nature and extent of the enemy’s attacks were almost totally unexpected.”[4]

Westmoreland and his J-2 (Intelligence) commander, General Philip Davidson, argued in 1968, and later, that MACV anticipated the Tet attacks. The two generals provided as proof of this contention the re-positioning in the weeks before the offensive of U.S. battalions in and around Saigon. Westmoreland claimed in his autobiography that he ordered General Fred Weyand at II Field Force Headquarters to redeploy U.S. combat battalions toward Saigon. But Weyand’s actions reveal that the U.S. anticipated attacks at Saigon, not across the entire length and breadth of South Vietnam.

Not one top administration official anticipated the offensive. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, the elderly Ellsworth Bunker, who was regularly briefed by the CIA’s Saigon Station Chief and MACV’s J-2, did not see the offensive coming. He wrote President Johnson on January 13, 1968, that all was well in South Vietnam. The U.S. was making progress; and it should continue with its present strategy and tactics. In other words, America was winning the war. Bunker wrote, “The past year has been one of sustained and unremitting effort and I believe has seen enough achievements to give us every encouragement to continue along the present lines.” The ambassador continued, “He [the enemy] has been thwarted in his attempts at penetration south of the DMZ….” In this report to the president, Bunker made no mention that all hell was about to break loose in South Vietnam.[5]

On January 18, the Board of National Estimates informed Director Helms that it could not predict with certainty Communist military actions in 1968. Its members stated, “In present circumstances it is true that any of a multitude of things could happen, at almost any time.”[6] Put simply, America’s top intelligence analysts had no idea what the Communists had planned for 1968.

On January 31, the day of the Vietcong attacks in Saigon, a CIA analyst in Saigon telegraphed George Carver, the CIA’s top Vietnam expert at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Referring to the attacks that received so much television coverage in the United States – including the assault on the U.S. embassy in downtown Saigon, the analyst wrote, “During the last few days, [CIA Saigon] Station has diligently pursued all available sources of intelligence that might have given us warning of these attacks.”[7] The CIA man in Saigon confessed to Carver that the CIA, with its vast network of field operatives across South Vietnam working inside the Pacification Program, had been caught by surprise at Tet.

Both outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and incoming Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, two men privy to the latest intelligence from the NSA, DIA, CIA, State Department, and the various branches of the U.S. military, privately expressed astonishment that the Communists had been able to launch such a major offensive. On the morning of January 31, as news of the attacks began trickling into the White House and Pentagon, McNamara spoke with Johnson on the phone about the catastrophe then unfolding in South Vietnam. He remarked, “Well, I think it shows two things, Mr. President. First, that they [the enemy] have more power than some credit them with. I don’t think it’s a last grasp effort…After they absorb the losses they will remain a substantial force.”[8] What McNamara was in fact saying was that some U.S. leaders had underestimated the capacity of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese to conduct a general offensive on the scale of Tet. If anything, the Secretary of Defense’s remarks were a sharp criticism of Westmoreland and Bunker, both of whom had recently told the president that the enemy in the South was in decline.  Clark Clifford later informed President Johnson that members of the Vietnam Task Force, a group with access to the latest intelligence on Vietnam, had been surprised by Tet.  He remarked, “Frankly, it came as a shock that the Vietcong-North Vietnamese had the strength of force and skill to mount the Tet Offensive – as they did.”[9]

There were other signs of a massive intelligence failure at Tet. On the morning of January 31, South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Thieu was not in Saigon to direct a defense of the capital. Rather, Thieu was in My Tho visiting his wife’s relatives. Had Thieu been aware of the coming offensive, he would not have been in My Tho, a city nearly taken by the Vietcong. As it turned out, an American helicopter had to evacuate Thieu from the embattled city. Unknown to the Vietcong, they had come close to capturing or killing the leader of South Vietnam.[10]

The fact that half of South Vietnam’s armed forces remained absent for duty at the time of the initial attacks provides further proof that neither the South Vietnamese nor the U.S. knew of the impending offensive. No commander in his right mind would have allowed hundreds of thousands of men to remain on leave had he been aware of a massive countrywide offensive about to take place.[11] Even though President Thieu officially cancelled the Tet truce at 9:45 a.m. on January 30, South Vietnamese military commanders were lackadaisical in calling their men back to duty in time to defend against the offensive.  Why?  Because commanders did not believe the offensive would begin that very night. Journalist Don Oberdorfer wrote that on January 30, there was, “no evidence of a widespread attempt by the Vietnamese government to recall its officers and men to duty.”[12]

In the field, U.S. troops confessed that the offensive took them by surprise. Tobias Wolff at My Tho recalled, “When the assault, the so-called Tet Offensive, first began we didn’t know what was going on.”[13] The most damning indictment of the U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence community’s inadequacies prior to Tet came from the Defense Department’s Systems Analysis Office and from National Security Council staffer William J. Jorden. Systems Analysis wrote, “In short, our setbacks [at Tet] were due to wishful thinking compounded by a massive intelligence collection and/or evaluation failure.”[14] On February 3, 1968, William J. Jorden wrote in a memo to National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, “…it is my opinion that the series of well-coordinated NVA/VC attacks in all parts of the country represents a distinct setback to the Government in Saigon and to us…[Tet is a setback because]…among other things, they [the Tet attacks] reflect probably the worst intelligence failure of the war…We didn’t have one single attack thoroughly anticipated, of the many that occurred. Something is rotten in the Vietnamese CIO, the Military Security Service and the National Police. And what about our [CIA] intelligence work in the provinces.”[15]

There is no written evidence that Rostow responded to Jorden’s damning assessment or that he shared the memo’s contents with the president. One possible reason Rostow kept the memo to himself – its contents reflected badly on him. As Johnson’s point man on national security matters, it was Rostow’s job to examine the existing intelligence and predict future threats to U.S. national security – such as a large-scale Communist offensive in South Vietnam. Rostow utterly failed in this respect in late 1967, and early 1968. He did not provide the president any advance warning of the attacks. So, when the attacks did come, the president was surprised too. Details of the attacks at the embassy and other U.S. and GVN facilities in the South Vietnamese capital came into the White House over the wires in the early afternoon of January 30, (Washington is twelve hours behind Saigon). Rostow conveyed the first reports to the President at 2:35 p.m., when he interrupted a meeting attended by Johnson.  Rostow told the president and the other assembled officials, “…we are being heavily mortared in Saigon. The Presidential Palace, our BOQ’s, the Embassy and the city itself have been hit.” Upon hearing this stunning news, Johnson, looking around the table, said, “This could be very bad.”[16]

Having let down his president, Rostow attempted to protect himself and his career. He determined the best way to do that was to downplay the significance of the Tet Offensive.

Only days after the start of the offensive, and weeks before a full accounting of U.S. and ARVN military and territorial losses could be made, Rostow declared Tet a major Communist defeat. In Rostow’s opinion, Tet was a desperate, go-for-broke operation. He argued privately, and publicly, that the Vietcong were on the brink of total collapse, wildly lashing out at the Allies before falling apart under the weight of high casualties. He even went so far as to contend that Tet provided the U.S. and South Vietnamese with a rare opportunity to exploit the Communists’ newfound weakness. In Rostow’s imaginary world, the Communists were down and the U.S. just needed to knock them out.

Rostow’s version of events completely distorted the realities of Tet, but it achieved one important result – it nullified his glaring professional inadequacies in the months before the offensive. Essentially, Rostow’s interpretation of Tet implied that it did not matter that he, or others in the intelligence community, such as the CIA’s George Carver, did not predict the offensive because Tet was actually a good thing, since in the course of the offensive tens of thousands of Vietcong exposed themselves to U.S. firepower. For Rostow, it was irrelevant that Tet had taken the Allies by surprise. The shock of the offensive’s beginning was negated by its bloody ending.[17]

Rostow’s views, although wrong, influenced Johnson. The president accepted Rostow’s version of events – for the same set of reasons that Rostow adhered to them so fervently. Rostow never wavered in his self-serving assessment of Tet, arguing as late as 1983, in the PBS documentary “Vietnam: A Television History,” that during Tet the U.S. dealt the Communists a significant military defeat.

As for Johnson, Rostow’s skewed interpretation explained away his own sub-par performance as Commander-in-Chief. On February 6, after reading Rostow’s analysis of Tet and its larger meaning for the U.S. war effort, LBJ remarked to several of his advisors, “I do not share the view that many people have that we took a great defeat [at Tet].”[18]

Several other top U.S. officials, with a lot riding professionally on the outcome in Vietnam, agreed with Rostow’s interpretation of Tet. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, General Westmoreland, JCS Chair Earle Wheeler, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk all claimed Tet as a U.S. victory. In part, Johnson’s advisors adhered to the Rostow line because their pre-Tet statements of progress in South Vietnam would have been shown to be utterly false, and their already frayed professional reputations diminished further, had they acknowledged Tet as a major U.S. defeat. Conversely, those without a history with the war, or who no longer had responsibility for its day-to-day conduct, saw Tet differently, including outgoing Secretary of Defense McNamara, incoming Secretary of Defense Clifford, and former White House advisor McGeorge Bundy.

Director Helms shared responsibility for the intelligence failure at Tet. His job, like Rostow’s, was to forecast Communist actions in South Vietnam. Helms explained away the CIA’s poor performance before Tet by arguing that the Communists had compartmentalized information of their Tet plans and preparations, making it impossible for the CIA to get a clear, overarching picture of the pending offensive. Of course, that was a lame excuse, since every military organization and intelligence service the world over compartmentalized information to protect operational security. It was the job of the Central Intelligence Agency – as its name implies – to centralize disparate intelligence information into a coherent whole.

In early 1968, Johnson should have fired Rostow, Bunker, Helms, Westmoreland, and MACV intelligence chief Davidson. But he didn’t because at this point in his flagging presidency Johnson valued blind loyalty over competency. In addition, his fall 1967, “progress tour” boxed him in. If Tet was a Vietcong victory, then Johnson’s “progress tour” would have been revealed for what it was – a complete sham. And as soon as the American people realized that Johnson had deceived them in 1967, and had been deceiving them for years, and that there had never been progress in the war in Vietnam, there would have developed tremendous political pressure on the president to get the U.S. out of South Vietnam as quickly as possible. And so, to keep the U.S. in the war and to prevent an American rout in South Vietnam, Johnson and his team perpetuated the lie of a U.S. victory at Tet. More specifically, the administration proclaimed that the U.S. irrevocably destroyed the Vietcong at Tet.  And those false claims served to perpetuate the war for another seven years.


[1] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 84, Editorial Note,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 241.

[2] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 34, Telegram From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler),” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 75-77; New York Times, “Viet Cong Attack 7 Cities; Allies Call Off Tet Truce,” Tom Buckley, January 30, 1968.

[3] Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/…/CIA-RDP80R01720R000100080001-8, page 3.

[4] Ibid., page 7.

[5] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 11, Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 28.

[6] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 19, Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 44.

[7] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 40, Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 90.

[8] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 37, Editorial Note,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 83.

[9] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 104, Notes of Meeting,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 318.

[10] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 40, Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 90.

[11] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 65, Notes of Meeting,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 170.

[12] Don Oberdorfer, Tet: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 134.

[13] Tobias Wolff, In Pharaoh’s Army: Memories of the Lost War, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 132.

[14] Vietnam Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon Papers, Parts IV.C.6 through IV.C.8, “IV.C.6. (c), U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967, Volume III,” (Nimble Books LLC, 2011), 27.

[15] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 49, Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 111-112.

[16] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 36, Notes of a Meeting,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 81-82.

[17] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, “Document 57, Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 132-134.

[18] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968FRUS, Vietnam, Volume VI, “Document 59, Notes of a Meeting,” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 139.

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4 Responses to TET ’68 and the Failure of the American Intelligence Community

  1. Robert G. Gaylord says:

    Your assertion that General Westmoreland, commanding general in Vietnam during the 1968 Tet offensive, was not briefed by intelligence staff that the Tet Offensive was imminent is absolutely false. On that day, December 22, 1967, I was debriefing from my intelligence staff duties at the 303rd Radio Research Battalion (ASA BN) and preparing for my return to the U.S., a contingent of senior officers from the 303rd RR BN traveled from Long Bien to Saigon to brief General Westmoreland about the likelihood of impending attacks on Saigon from NVA Divisions and Regiments which had over several months infiltrated from North Vietnam into the Saigon-Cholon Special Sector.
    The 303rd RR Battalion had during, October/November 1967, identified and tracked numerous NVA Divisions and Regiment HQ units into the Saigon-Cholon Special Sector area. On about December 14, 1967, the 303rd Battalion’s intelligence liaison had briefed Lt. General Fred Weyand, CG of II Field Force, at Long Binh, about those facts. Lt. General Weyand had over the previous months become a believer in the 303rd’s reports by witnessing the accuracy of the intelligence provided by the 303rd RR Battalion; he was convinced that this latest report was accurate. Shortly thereafter, Lt. General Weyand briefed General Westmoreland about the 303rd’s findings. Within a day of his briefing, Lt. General Weyand got back to his 303rd’s intelligence liaison that General Westmoreland hadn’t seemed particularly interested in the 303rd’s report. Lieutenant General Weyand urgently requested that the 303rd Battalion schedule another briefing with General Westmoreland to review in greater detail the 303rd’s findings. That briefing was arranged through and with the support of the 303rd’s senior headquarters in Saigon, the 509th ASA (RR) Intelligence Group and its commanding major general. The 509th Intelligence Group was located at Tan Son Nhut airport, adjacent to General Westmoreland’s headquarters there. The briefing was held on the 22nd of December 1967 with senior officers from the 303rd RR Battalion, 509th Intelligence Group and General Westmoreland’s staff attending.
    That day, I was at my desk near the entrance to the 303rd’s operations building at Long Bien, RVN when the briefing team left for Saigon and when they returned several hours later. When the briefing team walked back into the operations building, I asked the primary briefing officer, a zealous and bright young captain, how the briefing had gone. He responded by saying, “I can’t believe that man” and punctuated his remark by hurling his large briefing loose-leaf notebook across the room where it bounced off the wall and split open with the notes, maps and diagrams all flying out. I was surprised by his outburst and subsequent aerial loose-leaf folder. The room was tomb-silent; the captain continued by saying that they had briefed General Westmoreland in depth with charts and maps and full identification of the dozen or more NVA Divisional and Regimental HQ units which were then arrayed around Saigon. He recounted that he had explained in detail to General Westmoreland the methods employed in the gathering and analysis of that intelligence. The intelligence had been gathered and analyzed by a U.S. Army ASA Battalion trained by and reporting to the National Security Agency. Intelligence gathered by the most sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment, methods and staff of that time. When the briefing was over Westmoreland asked the briefing team what they expected him to do with their information. They replied that at minimum he needed to put U.S. troops back on full alert and in combat ready status for the likely Vietcong and NVA attacks to come. Westmoreland responded that he didn’t know for certain that the attacks were going to happen, he questioned the accuracy of the intelligence briefing he had just received, and he said he wouldn’t take the troops off stand-down because he’d take too much flack from the politicians in Washington for doing so. The 303rd Radio Research Battalion’s officers and NCO’s had worked diligently for months gathering and confirming the intelligence information they had presented to Westmoreland, and they stood there on that late December afternoon having had the door of the most senior authority in Vietnam slammed in their faces.
    Westmoreland did nothing with the intelligence information he received that day. What the 303rd RR BN warned on December 22, 1967 was going to happen came to fruition on January 30, 1968 and a lot of U.S. soldiers and many Vietnamese military and civilians died during the Tet Offensive of 1968 because of his inaction. It was the beginning of the end for the U.S. in Vietnam.

    • Robert, I appreciate your detailed description of the 303rd’s role in the lead up to the Tet Offensive. It’s an interesting story. However, your information doesn’t contradict the primary assertion made in the article – that Westmoreland believed the Tet attacks would take place in a few locales rather than countrywide. Even after the countrywide assault had begun on January 30, COMUSMACV continued to believe Khe Sanh to be the focus of the communist offensive. I also wonder whether Westmoreland initially considered the intelligence about communist troop movements near Saigon as a ruse designed to pull U.S. attention (and possibly troops) away from other regions of the country, such as Khe Sanh and the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border zone.

  2. Bob Gibson says:

    I wonder which side General Westmoreland was on ?!

    • Bob Gaylord says:

      Westmoreland was alerted to the coming TET offensive on December 23, 1967. He was briefed by the 303rd RR Battalion on that day in coordination with Lt. General Fred Weyend, CG of II Field Force at Long Bien, RVN. The briefing happened at Westmoreland’s HQ at Tan Son Nhut airbase. in RVN. Additionally, present for the briefing was the CG of the 509th RR Group, located next to Westmoreland’s HQ. The Briefing was conducted informing Westmoreland of which NVA Divisions and Regiment HQ’s had infiltrated from North Vietnam into the Saigon-Cholon Special Sector around Saigon. Westmoreland blew off the briefing and said he didn’t know the intelligence was accurate. When he asked the briefing officers what action he should take, they said he should put all US forces back on alert (they were then on a Tet stand-down. Westmoreland said he couldn’t do that because he’d get too much flack from Washington for calling the troops back to full alert. Instead, Westmoreland did nothing and what the briefing intelligence organization said did in fact happen at the expense of many US and South Vietnamese deaths. The briefing unit was the 303rd RR BN, (read 303rd ASA Battalion) which was the US Army’s contingent of the National Security Agency. ASA employed the latest and best intelligence gathering technology at that time in history. I believe Westmoreland was following the dictates of President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who at that point wanted to downplay the Vietnamese war. Particularly at Christmas time. How do I know, I was a junior intelligence officer (1st LT) at the 303rd RR BN and was present in the 303rd’s operations building when the briefing team left for Saigon that morning and when they returned several hours later. The briefing officers explained their briefing to Westmoreland and reported his response. The young Captain who was the main briefer that day walked back into the operations building and I asked him how the briefing had gone. He said, “I can’t believe that man.” and he pitched his large briefing loose leaf folder across the room where it bounced off the wall and the maps and diagrams flew out, He explained the indepth briefing which he had given to Westmoreland. Identifying the specific NVA Units involved and how they had tracked them, over three months, on their trip south from North Vietnam to the Saigon area. WESTMORELAND HAD BEEN INFORMED BUT CHOSE TO IGNORE THAT BRIEFING. And more history beyond that briefing and the TET offensive, CBS aired a critical review of those events in the early to mid- 1980’s. Westmoreland filed suit against CBS and lost his case when a number of his senior officers at the time, verified, in court, the CBS version of that terrible TET offensive. I could go on, but there is plenty of information out there about what really happened in contradiction to Westmoreland’s report of events, Read Sorley and others. Regardless, there are people who are trying to erase and rewrite the actual history of that event. What I’ve written here actually happened. I saw the gathering of intelligence information over three months by the 303rd RR BN. I knew that Lt General Fred Weyand had been briefed by the 303rd’s intelligence liaison officer, Major Bob Betts. I was in those daily intelligence meetings before Betts went up the hill to brief Weyand. It did happen, Westmoreland was briefed weeks before the actual TET offensive happened but he did nothing.

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