By spring 1965, large swaths of the South Vietnamese countryside had fallen under Vietcong control. Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, a man who prided himself on his analytical skills, wrote in a memorandum dated March 24, 1965, that “The situation in general is bad and deteriorating. The VC have the initiative. Defeatism is gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities, and even among the soldiers – especially those with relatives in rural areas. The Hop Tac [pacification] area around Saigon is making little progress; the Delta stays bad; the country has been severed in the north. GVN control is shrinking to the enclaves, some burdened with refugees.” [Herring, Pentagon Papers, 116] McNaughton’s reference to the demoralization of ARVN troops with relatives in rural areas is instructive. The morale of the ARVN began to plummet because South Vietnamese troops found it increasingly difficult to visit family members in the many hamlets that had recently been lost to the Vietcong. Continue Reading »
Ho’s Trojan Horses: The Vietcong and the Fortified Countryside
Falling Dominoes
“…you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the falling domino principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences…So, the possible consequences of the loss [of Indochina] are just incalculable to the free world.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 7, 1954, in a statement to the press
In its most basic articulation, the Domino Theory postulated that the fall of one pro-Western nation to communism would lead to the rapid communist subjugation of adjoining Western-bloc nations. Every president from Truman to Nixon, either believed in the Domino Theory or recognized its usefulness as a tool in garnering domestic support for U.S. involvement abroad. The theory’s proponents did not believe it applicable to every region of the world. However, it was considered most pertinent to the East-West confrontation in Indochina. Continue Reading »
Vietnam’s Coastal Plain
Vietnam’s Coastal Plain stretches 638 miles in a narrow arch from Vinh (in the former Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)) to Phan Thiet (in the former Republic of Vietnam (RVN)). It is bordered on the east by the blue waters of the South China Sea and on the west by the dark green mountains of the Central Highlands. In one of its widest segments at Hoi An, the plain extends 28 miles from the coast to the mountains. In its narrowest reaches in northern Binh Dinh Province, it is less than a mile from the coastline to the highlands. Continue Reading »
The Eternal Highlands of Vietnam
Within the Annamese Cordillera is a sub-region known as the Central Highlands. The Central Highlands are actually the southernmost segment of the cordillera. The Americans knew the Central Highlands as the mountainous region stretching from the 17th Parallel south to the area of Da Lat. However, the Vietnamese have defined the highlands as the mountain and plateau area that extends from Kontum Province in the north to Lam Dong Province in the south. Continue Reading »
Partitioning Vietnam: Making the Division Permanent
A common myth surrounding the 1954 partition of Vietnam holds that three of the primary negotiators at the Geneva Conference, French Foreign Minister Pierre Mendes-France, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and Pham Van Dong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam decided rather nonchalantly, and at the last moment, to establish the demarcation line at the 17th Parallel. Apparently, just hours before the approach of the July 21st deadline for an agreement, Mendes-France proposed a partition line at the 18th Parallel. Pham Van Dong countered with the 16th Parallel. Molotov, hoping to quickly wrap-up the negotiations, then flippantly proposed the 17th Parallel. The French and Vietnamese immediately recognized the reasonableness of Molotov’s compromise proposal and agreed to the 17th Parallel. Not only is this story untrue, it ignores how serious the French and Vietnamese communists viewed the issue of the demarcation line. It was one of the key stumbling blocks during the months-long negotiations at Geneva. French and Vietnamese failure to agree on a demarcation line nearly torpedoed the peace talks on several occasions. Both the French and Vietnamese understood that the location of the dividing line had significant political and military implications. Continue Reading »




