The United States and Soviet Union emerged from World War II as the world’s two most powerful nation states. Yet, the United States far surpassed the Soviet Union in economic and military might. For instance, four years after the conclusion of the war, it was estimated that the United States possessed a Gross National Product (GNP) of 250 billion dollars compared to the U.S.S.R.’s 65 billion [May, Interpreting NSC-68, 36]. The larger, diversified U.S. economy translated into an impressive standard of living for its citizens. The American people experienced an unprecedented material abundance. No other society in world history had ever been so wealthy. Nor had any other country developed such high levels of efficiencies in manufacturing and agricultural production. U.S. economic strength underpinned the U.S.’s military might. Continue Reading »
U.S. Containment Policy and Communist Wars of National Liberation
Falling Dominoes
“…you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the falling domino principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences…So, the possible consequences of the loss [of Indochina] are just incalculable to the free world.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 7, 1954, in a statement to the press
In its most basic articulation, the Domino Theory postulated that the fall of one pro-Western nation to communism would lead to the rapid communist subjugation of adjoining Western-bloc nations. Every president from Truman to Nixon, either believed in the Domino Theory or recognized its usefulness as a tool in garnering domestic support for U.S. involvement abroad. The theory’s proponents did not believe it applicable to every region of the world. However, it was considered most pertinent to the East-West confrontation in Indochina. Continue Reading »
Partitioning Vietnam: Making the Division Permanent
A common myth surrounding the 1954 partition of Vietnam holds that three of the primary negotiators at the Geneva Conference, French Foreign Minister Pierre Mendes-France, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and Pham Van Dong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam decided rather nonchalantly, and at the last moment, to establish the demarcation line at the 17th Parallel. Apparently, just hours before the approach of the July 21st deadline for an agreement, Mendes-France proposed a partition line at the 18th Parallel. Pham Van Dong countered with the 16th Parallel. Molotov, hoping to quickly wrap-up the negotiations, then flippantly proposed the 17th Parallel. The French and Vietnamese immediately recognized the reasonableness of Molotov’s compromise proposal and agreed to the 17th Parallel. Not only is this story untrue, it ignores how serious the French and Vietnamese communists viewed the issue of the demarcation line. It was one of the key stumbling blocks during the months-long negotiations at Geneva. French and Vietnamese failure to agree on a demarcation line nearly torpedoed the peace talks on several occasions. Both the French and Vietnamese understood that the location of the dividing line had significant political and military implications. Continue Reading »


