This book will examine a multitude of issues related to the geography of the Vietnam War, including the geographical reasons for the establishment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, the influence of American bombing on settlement patterns in South Vietnam, the role of refugees during the Tet Offensive, and how colossal American bases fostered both a physical and perceptual distance between the xenophobic South Vietnamese and the American military.

Other topics under examination include how sea access influenced the initial American build-up in 1965, why Westmoreland rejected a coastal enclave strategy, the consequences of Westmoreland’s hinterland strategy, the importance of airstrips in South Vietnam in the early stages of the war, and the reasons the U.S. engaged in a massive road-building program in South Vietnam after 1968.  The book concludes with the argument that geographical factors had unpredictable and frequently detrimental influences on America’s conduct of the Vietnam War.  By 1975, the war-torn land of South Vietnam undermined the American military effort.