In the fall of 1967, a number of prominent public figures began to question whether General William C. Westmoreland’s big unit war would ever achieve U.S. objectives in South Vietnam.  Several of these individuals voiced their concerns to President Johnson on November 2, during the second day of meetings at the White House of a group collectively known as the Wisemen.

One of the Wisemen, former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, told President Johnson that the primary reason for declining domestic support for the war was the high number of U.S. casualties. If casualties could be brought down, the home front could be steadied. With the recent defeat of Lt. Col. Terry Allen’s Jr.’s battalion in Binh Duong Province possibly on his mind, Lodge said, “An exclusive military victory is not conceivable to me.” He then went on to say that instead of Westmoreland’s current concept of operations, the U.S. should pursue a “…split up and keep off balance…” strategy. Lodge argued that such a strategy, “…utilizes the smaller units and means less casualties…[and] also diminishes the number of refugees.””  In other words, abandoning the big unit war would not only stabilize the home front, it would, by reducing collateral damage and refugee numbers, enhance South Vietnam’s increasingly fragile social stability.[1] Continue Reading »